There is no one standard for the specification of biometric features (each vendor has its own proprietary feature specification), and while it may be possible to convert fingerprint features from one vendor system to be used by another vendor’s system, I don’t know if this is possible for face and iris features.īest-case scenario? Even if the Taliban or its friends can access the data on the devices, the data does not provide enough information for it to be used. Also, the features stored on the devices may or may not be useful.Obviously the more textual information that is available, such as a name, the more useful the data can be. In addition, I don’t know what textual data is linked to the features (or images) on these devices.And while biometric images are necessary in some cases (such as forensic latent fingerprint examination), there’s no need for images in devices that make a hit/no-hit decision without human intervention. Features derived from the images (which are necessary in matching anyway) take up much less storage space. While there’s the possibility that the devices stored biometric images, that has a drawback because of the large size of the images. For example, I don’t know whether their on-board biometric data is limited to just biometric features (rather than images).As we’ve learned over the years, Pakistan and the Taliban (and the Taliban’s allies such as al Qaeda) are NOT bitter enemies.Īs I said, I don’t know enough about HIIDE and SEEK, so I’m not sure about some key things. Someone interviewed by the Intercept speculated that even if the Taliban did not have the technological capability to hack the devices, it could turn to Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence to do so. Can the Taliban actually access the data? And how much data is on the devices themselves? (Yes, folks, these devices are called HIIDE and SEEK.)Īt the time that this was revealed, I posted the following comment on LinkedIn:
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